Distributed Trust:  Supporting Fault-tolerance and Attack-tolerance by Schneider, Fred B. & Zhou, Lidong
Distributed Trust:
Supporting Fault-tolerance and
Attack-tolerance
Fred B. Schneider1
Department of Computer Science
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York 14853
Lidong Zhou
Microsoft Research
1065 La Avenida
Mountain View, California 94043
January 20, 2004
1Supported in part by ARPA/RADC grant F30602-96-1-0317, AFOSR grant F49620-
03-1-0156, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Re-
search Laboratory Air Force Material Command USAF under agreement number F30602-
99-1-0533, National Science Foundation Grant 0205452, and grants from Intel Corpora-
tion and Microsoft Corporation. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of
the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies
or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of these organizations or the U.S. Govern-
ment.
Abstract
Fault-tolerance and attack-tolerance are crucial for implementing a trustwor-
thy service. An emerging thread of research investigates interactions between
fault-tolerance and attack-tolerance—specifically, the coupling of replication with
threshold cryptography for use in environments satisfying weak assumptions. This
coupling yields a new paradigm known as distributed trust, which is the subject of
this paper.
1 Introduction
A trustworthy service must operate as intended despite failures and attacks. Im-
plementing the necessary fault-tolerance and attack-tolerance can be a real chal-
lenge. For one thing, separation of concerns does not apply, because approaches
to implementing fault-tolerance can reduce a system’s attack-tolerance. An ex-
ample is n-fold replication of a secret s, which adds fault-tolerance and improves
the availability of s but does so by increasing from 1 to n the number of sites that
must resist attacks to preserve the confidentiality of s.
Other interactions also exist between schemes for achieving fault-tolerance
and those for attack-tolerance. One goal of this article is to give a principled
account of the landscape. A second goal is to outline a general approach for
building trustworthy services from untrustworthy components, thereby providing
a snapshot of an emerging research thread, which incorporates attack-tolerance
not as an afterthought to fault-tolerance but as an integral part of a distributed
system’s architecture and protocols.
2 Replication Caveats
The basic recipe for implementing a fault-tolerant service [19, 27] is well known:
1. Start with a server, structured as a deterministic state machine, that reads
and processes client submitted requests which are the sole means to change
the server’s state and/or produce an output.
2. Run replicas of that server on distinct hosts in a distributed system.
3. Employ a replica-coordination protocol to ensure that all non-faulty server
replicas process identical sequences of requests.
Correct server replicas thus produce identical outputs for each given client request.
Moreover, the majority of the outputs produced for each request will come from
correct replicas provided (i) at most f replicas execute on faulty hosts, and (ii) the
service comprises at least 2f+1 server replicas. So we succeed in implementing a
service that tolerates at most f faulty hosts by taking as the outputs of the service
the responses produced by a majority of the server replicas.
Implicit in this basic recipe are some caveats. The first is a presumption that
host failures are independent. Empirical observations from real systems confirms
that this presumption is often a realistic approximation. Attacks are a different
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story. An adversary that disrupts one replica will probably be able to exploit the
same vulnerability at other replicas and disrupt them as well. So although having
2f + 1 replicas might tolerate up to f faulty hosts, all 2f + 1 replicas might
succumb to a single attack. Adding attack-tolerance to fault-tolerance requires
rethinking assumptions about independence, with (as we shall see) a profound
effect on the system’s design.
A second caveat is implicit in step 3 of the basic recipe. Replica-coordination
protocols can exist only for certain computational models or, equivalently, in sys-
tems satisfying certain assumptions [11]. Assumptions are a double-edged sword.
On the one hand, the system builder’s job is simplified when stronger assumptions
are made about environments in which a system will run. On the other hand, the
adversary’s job is also simplified—stronger assumptions are easier to invalidate
through attacks. And once an assumption on which the system depends has been
invalidated, correct system operation is no longer guaranteed so the adversary has
succeeded.
Particularly problematic are the assumptions about process execution speeds
and message-delivery delays that define the synchronous model of distributed
computation. Most replica-coordination protocols assume this model, but denial-
of-service attacks invalidate timing assumptions and, therefore, replica-coordination
protocols based on the synchronous model are vulnerable to denial-of-service at-
tacks. So weaker computational models must be adopted in supporting attack-
tolerance, and those weaker computational models, in turn, affect what replica
coordination is possible.
A final caveat accompanying our basic fault-tolerance recipe is related to con-
fidentiality. Even services that do not operate on confidential data are likely to
store cryptographic keys so that messages can be authenticated. Confidentiality
of these keys must be maintained. As discussed in §1, an adversary bent on learn-
ing confidential information benefits when a copy of that information is stored at
many server replicas. Straightforward replication, the mainstay of fault-tolerance,
is thus antithetical to attack-tolerance if confidentiality is sought.
So the road from fault-tolerance to trustworthy services might start with repli-
cation but doesn’t end there. The three caveats just identified suggest changes
needed to the basic recipe in order to achieve attack tolerance. The remainder
of this article sketches a design space for implementing those changes, with the
caveat about independence of hosts discussed in §4, replication-management for
weaker computational models discussed in §5, and confidentiality of service data
discussed in §6.
2
3 Compromise and Recovery
Two general types of components are involved in building trustworthy services:
processors and channels. Processors serve as hosts; channels enable these hosts
to communicate.
A correct component only exhibits intended behavior; a compromised com-
ponent can exhibit other behaviors. Component compromise is caused by failures
and/or attacks. We make no assumption about the behavior of compromised com-
ponents (the so-called Byzantine failure model), but we do conservatively assume
that a component C compromised by a successful attack is then controlled by the
adversary, with any secrets stored by C becoming known to the adversary.
Channel Compromise. Secrets an adversary learns by compromising one com-
ponent might facilitate the subsequent compromise of other components. For ex-
ample, a correct channel protects the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of
messages it carries. This functionality is typically implemented cryptographically,
with keys stored not by the channel itself but at the hosts serving as the channel’s
endpoints. An attack that compromises a host thus yields secrets that then allow
the adversary to compromise all channels attached to the host.
Because channels are typically implemented by the hosts serving as the chan-
nel’s endpoints, trustworthiness for a service is often specified solely in terms of
which or how many host compromises can be tolerated. The possibility of channel
compromise separate from host compromise is thus ignored. This approximation,
which we also adopt in this paper, is sensible when the network topology pro-
vides several physically independent paths to each host, because then the channel
connecting a host is unlikely to fail independent of that host.
Host Recovery Protocols. The system builder has little control over how and
when a component transitions from being correct to being compromised. A re-
covery protocol provides the means to reverse such transitions. For a faulty com-
ponent, the recovery protocol might involve replacing or repairing hardware. For
a component that has been attacked, the recovery protocol must not only evict
the adversary—perhaps by restoring code (ideally with newly discovered vul-
nerabilities patched) from clean media and by reconstituting state (perhaps from
other servers)—but it must also replace any secret keys the adversary might have
learned.
The reason to execute a recovery protocol after detecting a failure or attack
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is obvious. Less obvious are the benefits that accrue from executing a recovery
protocol periodically, even though no compromise has been detected [15]. To
wit, such proactive recovery defends against undetected attacks and failures by
transforming a service that tolerates t compromised hosts over its entire lifetime
into a system that tolerates up to t compromised hosts during each window of
vulnerability delimited by executions of the recovery protocol. The details of
coordinating the servers without making synchrony assumptions might be tricky,
but the benefits are substantial: with proactive recovery an adversary that cannot
compromise t + 1 hosts within a window of vulnerability is foiled and forced to
begin anew on a system with all defenses restored to full strength.
Denial-of-service attacks can slow execution, thereby lengthening the win-
dow of vulnerability and increasing the interval available to perpetrate an attack.
Whether such a lengthened window of vulnerability is significant depends on
whether it affords the adversary an opportunity to compromise more than t servers
during the window. But whatever the adversary, systems with proactive recovery
are inherently more resilient than those without it, simply because proactive re-
covery affords the opportunity for servers to recover from past compromises.
Service Keys: Refresh and Scalability
A client, after making a request, awaits responses from servers. When the com-
promise of up to t servers must be tolerated, the same response received from
fewer than t servers cannot be considered correct. But if the response is received
by t + 1 or more servers then it was necessarily produced by a correct server.
So sets of t + 1 servers together speak for the service, and clients require some
means to identify when equivalent responses have come from t+1 distinct server
replicas.
One way to ascertain the origin of responses from correct servers is to employ
digital signatures. Each server’s response is digitally signed using a private key
known only to that server; the receiver validates the origin of a response by check-
ing the signature using that server’s public key. A server’s private key thus speaks
for that server. Less expensive schemes, involving message authentication codes
(MAC) and shared secrets, have also been developed [9].
The use of secrets—be it private keys or shared secret keys—for authenticating
server replicas to clients impacts the scalability of a service that employs proactive
recovery. This is because new secrets must be selected at the start of each window
of vulnerability, and clients must then be notified of the changes. If the number
of clients is large, then this communication is expensive and the resulting service
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ceases to be scalable.
To build a service that is scalable, we seek a scheme whereby clients need not
be informed of periodic changes to server keys. Since sets of t+1 or more servers
speak for the service, a client could identify a correct response from the service if
the service is provided with some way to digitally sign responses exactly when a
set of servers that speak for the service agree on that response:
TC1: Any set of t + 1 or more server replicas can cooperate and digitally
sign a message on behalf of the service.
TC2: No set of t or fewer server replicas can contrive to digitally sign a
message on behalf of the service.
TC1 implies that information held by t + 1 or more servers enables them to to-
gether construct a digital signature for a message (namely, for the service’s re-
sponse to a request), whereas TC2 implies that no coalition of t or fewer servers
has enough information to construct such a digital signature. In effect, TC1 and
TC2 characterize a new form of private key for digital signatures associated with
the service (rather than with the individual servers). This private key speaks for
the service but is never entirely materialized at individual servers comprising the
service.
A private key satisfying TC1 and TC2 can be implemented using secret shar-
ing. An (n, t + 1) secret sharing for a secret s is a set of n random shares such
that (i) s can be recovered with knowledge of t + 1 shares, and (ii) no informa-
tion about s can be derived from t or fewer shares. Not only do protocols exist
to construct (n, t + 1) secret sharings [28, 2] but threshold digital signature pro-
tocols [3, 10] exist that allow a digital signature to be constructed for a message
from t + 1 partial signatures, where each partial signature is computed using as
inputs the message and only a single share of the private key. Thus, TC1 and TC2
can be implemented by using (n, t + 1) secret sharing and dividing the service
private key among the server replicas—one share per replica—and then having
servers use threshold digital signatures to collaborate in signing responses.
Just like with ordinary secret keys or private keys, attack-tolerance improves
if proactive recovery periodically refreshes shares of the service’s signing key. In
particular, this defends against so-called mobile adversaries [24] which attack,
compromise, and control one server for a limited period before moving to the
next. Over time, a mobile adversary might compromise t+1 servers, obtain t+1
shares, and thus be able to speak for the service, generating correctly signed bogus
service responses.
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The defense against mobile adversaries is, as part of proactive recovery, for
servers periodically to (i) create a new and independent secret sharing for the ser-
vice private key, and then (ii) delete the old shares, replacing them with the new
shares. Because the new and old secret sharings are independent, a mobile ad-
versary cannot combine new shares and old shares in order to obtain the service’s
signing key. And because old shares are deleted when replaced by new shares, a
mobile adversary must compromise more than t servers within a single window
of vulnerability in order to succeed.
Protocols to create new, independent sharings of a secret are called proactive
secret sharing protocols and have been developed both for synchronous systems
[15] and for asynchronous systems [5, 34]. The problem is a bit tricky to imple-
ment:
• The new sharing must be computed without ever materializing the shared
secret at any server. (A server that materialized the shared secret, if com-
promised even momentarily, could be in danger of revealing the service’s
signing key to the adversary.)
• The protocol must work correctly in the presence of as many as t compro-
mised servers, which might provide bogus shares to the protocol.
Server Keys: Refresh
Secure communications channels between servers is required for proactive secret
sharing and the various other protocols servers execute. Since keys used to im-
plement a secure channel are stored by the hosts at the endpoints of that channel,
we conclude that, not withstanding the use of secret sharing and threshold cryp-
tography for service private keys, there will be other cryptographic keys stored at
servers. If these other keys can be compromised then they too must be refreshed
during proactive recovery. Three classes of solutions have been proposed.
Tamper-proof Hardware. Although not in widespread use today, special-purpose,
tamper-proof hardware that stores keys and performs cryptographic op-
erations (e.g., encryption and decryption) does exist. Moreover, interest
seems to be increasing, with industry groups like TCG (Trusted Comput-
ing Group), its predecessor TCPA (Trusted Computing Platform Alliance),
and recent product announcements from Intel and Microsoft joining IBM’s
long-standing efforts.
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The special-purpose, tamper-proof hardware is designed so that, if correctly
installed, it will not divulge keys even if the software on the attached host
has been compromised. When keys stored by a server cannot be revealed,
there is no reason to refresh them. So, storing server keys in tamper-proof
hardware attached to a server eliminates the need to refresh server keys as
part of proactive recovery.
Tamper-proof hardware does not prevent a compromised server from per-
forming cryptographic operations for the adversary. The adversary might,
for example, cause the server to generate signed or encrypted messages for
later use (in attacks). To detect such bogus messages, the tamper-proof hard-
ware could maintain an integer counter in stable memory (so the counter’s
value will persist across failures and restarts). The counter is incremented
every time a new window of vulnerability starts; and the current counter
value is included in every message that is encrypted or signed using the
tamper-proof hardware. A server can now discard any message it receives
that has a counter value too low for the current window of vulnerability.
Off-line Keys. Here, new keys are distributed using a separate secure communi-
cations channel the adversary cannot compromise. This channel will typi-
cally be implemented cryptographically by using secrets that are stored and
used in an off-line stand-alone computer, thereby ensuring inaccessibility to
a network-borne adversary. For example, an administrative public/private
key pair could be associated with each server H . The administrative public
key KˆH is stored in ROM on all servers; the associated private key kˆH is
stored off-line and is known only to the administrator ofH . Each new server
private key kA for a host A would be generated off-line. The corresponding
public key KA would then be distributed to all servers by including KA in a
certificate signed using the administrative private key kˆA of server A.
Attacks Awareness. Instead of relying on a full-fledged tamper-proof co-processor,
a scheme in Canetti and Herzberg [8] uses non-modifiable storage (e.g.,
ROM) to store a special service-wide public key, whose corresponding pri-
vate key is shared among servers using an (n, t + 1) secret sharing. To
refresh its server key pair, a server H generates its new private/public key
pair, signs the new public key using the old private key, and then requests
that the service endorse the new public key. Such an endorsement is repre-
sented by a certificate that associates the new public key with server H and
that is signed using the special service private key.
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The service private key is refreshed periodically using proactive secret shar-
ing, thereby guaranteeing that an attacker cannot learn the service private
key provided the attacker cannot compromise more than t servers in a win-
dow of vulnerability. Therefore, an attacker cannot fabricate a valid en-
dorsement because bogus certificates are detected by servers using the ser-
vice public key stored in their ROM. A server becomes aware of an attack if
it does not receive a valid certificate for its new public key within a reason-
able amount of time. In this case, actions are initiated to re-introduce the
server into the system and remove the possible imposter of that server.
A server’s receipt of two conflicting requests (signed by the victim’s private
key) for endorsement triggers the broadcast of an alarm. Such conflict-
ing requests could occur if an attacker compromises a server, obtains the
server’s private key in the previous window of vulnerability, and sends a
key refresh request signed by that private key. To impede denial-of-service
attacks based on false alarms, an alarm message is ignored unless it is ac-
companied by the conflicting (signed) endorsement request messages as ev-
idence. Manual interventions are required when any server detects an alarm.
4 Eluding the Processor Independence Caveat
We elude the processor independence caveat to the extent that actions—attacks or
host failures—cannot cause multiple hosts to become compromised. For example,
independence is reduced when
• hosts employ common software (and thus all replicas could be compromised
by the same attacks),
• hosts are operated by the same organization (because a single maleficent
operator could then access and compromise more than a singled host), or
• hosts rely on a common infrastructure, such as the name servers or network
of routers used to support their communications, since the compromise of
that infrastructure violates an assumption needed for the hosts to function.
One general way to characterize the trustworthiness of a service is by describ-
ing which sets of components could together be compromised without disrupting
correct operation of the service. Each vulnerability V partitions server replicas
into groups, where replicas in a given group share that vulnerability. For instance,
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there exist attacks that compromise server replicas running Linux but not those
running Windows (and vice versa), which leads to a partitioning according to op-
erating system; and the effects of a maleficent operator are likely localized to
server replicas under that operator’s control, which leads to a partitioning accord-
ing to system operator.
Sets of a system’s servers whose compromise must be tolerated can be spec-
ified using an adversary structure [16]. This is a set A = {S1, . . . , Sr} whose
elements are sets of system servers an adversary is assumed able to compromise
during the same window of vulnerability. A trustworthy service is then expected
to continue operating as long as the set of compromised servers is an element of
A. Thus, the adversary structure A for a system intended to tolerate attacks on the
operating system would contain sets Si whose elements are servers all running the
same operating system.
When there are n server replicas and A contains all sets of servers of size at
most t, the result is known as an (n, t) threshold adversary structure [28]. The
basic recipe in §2 for implementing a fault-tolerant service involves a thresh-
old adversary structure, as does much of the discussion throughout this article.
Threshold adversary structures correspond to systems in which server replicas are
assumed to be independent and equally vulnerable. They are, at best, approxima-
tions of reality. The price of embracing such approximations is loss of fault- or
attack-tolerance, because now single events might actually compromise all of the
servers in some set that is not an element of the adversary structure.
Although threshold adversary structures are not accurate models of reality,
protocols designed for threshold adversary structures frequently have straightfor-
ward generalizations to more-general adversary structures that are. What is less
well understood is how to identify an appropriate adversary structure, since doing
so requires determining what common vulnerabilities exist. Today’s systems gen-
erally employ commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components wherever possible,
which for commercial reasons restrict access to internal details useful for identi-
fying common vulnerabilities. Those hoping to formulate adversary structures for
a system are thus handicapped.
Independence by Avoiding Common Vulnerabilities
Eliminating software bugs eliminates vulnerabilities and thus eliminates common
vulnerabilities that would thwart independence of replicas. The construction of
bug-free software is quite difficult, however. So instead we exploit another means
to increase replica the independence: diversity. In particular, the basic recipe in
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§2 for fault-tolerance through replication does not require that server replicas be
identical in either their design or their implementation—only that all server repli-
cas implement the same deterministic state machine. That is, different replicas
must produce equivalent responses for each given request.
Such diversity can be obtained in three ways:
• Develop multiple server implementations. This, unfortunately, can be ex-
pensive. The cost of all facets of system development are multiplied because
each replica now has its own design, implementation, and testing costs. In
addition, interoperation of diverse components is typically more difficult to
get working, not withstanding the adoption of standards. Finally, experi-
ments have shown that distinct development groups working from a com-
mon specification will produce software having the same bugs [18].
• Employ pre-existing diverse components that have similar functionality and
write software wrappers so that all implement the same interface and the
same state machine behavior [27, 26]. One difficulty here is procuring di-
verse components that do have the requisite similar functionality. Some op-
erating systems (e.g., BSD UNIX vs. Linux) have multiple, diverse imple-
mentations but other operating systems do not; and application components
we use in building a service are unlikely to have multiple diverse realiza-
tions. A second difficulty arises when components do not provide access
to internal non-deterministic choices they make during execution (e.g., for
creating a handle that will be returned to a client), since now writing the
wrapper can be quite difficult [26].
• Introduce diversity automatically during compilation, loading, or in the run-
time environment [12, 32]. Code can typically be generated and storage
allocated in any number of ways for a given high-level language program;
making choices in producing different executables introduces a measure of
diversity. Different executables for the same high-level language program
are still implementations of the same algorithms, though, so executables
obtained in this manner will continue to share any flaws in those algorithms.
The third of these approaches—automatic introduction of diversity—holds
great promise because it allows repeatedly changing each replica during system
operation, perhaps as part of proactive recovery. Thus, not only would differ-
ent replicas have different vulnerabilities, but the vulnerabilities at any given host
would change periodically. So an attack that succeeds during one window of vul-
nerability against a given host might not work during the next. Termed proactive
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obfuscation, the infrastructure to support this approach is currently being built by
Schneider and collaborators at Cornell.
Finally, note that because state machine replicas must implement the same in-
terface, these replicas cannot be completely independent. A service that supports
an operation whose semantics has a vulnerability will exhibit that vulnerability
with or without state machine replication. Defining a service interface and opera-
tions whose semantics cannot be abused is thus of paramount import for building
a trustworthy service.
5 Embracing the Replica Coordination Caveat
In the basic recipe of §2, not only must state machine replicas exhibit indepen-
dence but all correct replicas must reach consensus about the contents and order-
ing of client requests. Therefore, the replica-coordination protocol must include
some sort of consensus protocol [25] to ensure that
• all correct state machine replicas agree on each client’s request, and
• if the client sends the same request R to all replicas then R is the consensus
they reach for that request.
This specification involves both a safety property and a liveness property. The
safety property prohibits different replicas from agreeing on different values or
orderings for any given request; the liveness property stipulates that an agreement
is always reached.
Consensus protocols exist only for systems satisfying certain assumptions [11],
and in particular deterministic consensus protocols do not exist for systems having
unboundedly slow message delivery or process execution speeds. This limitation
arises because to reach consensus in such an asynchronous system, participating
state machine replicas must distinguish between (i) those replicas that have halted
(due to failures) and thus should be ignored and (ii) those replicas that, though
correct, are executing very slowly and thus cannot be ignored.
The impossibility of implementing a deterministic consensus protocol in asyn-
chronous systems leaves three options.
Option I: Abandon State Machine Replication. Instead of replicating a state
machine that directly implements the service semantics, we might instead im-
plement and replicate a server that only supports read and write operations on
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storage servers. These servers are then organized as a quorum system, and the
desired trustworthy service is implemented on top.
To constitute a quorum system, the storage servers are associated with groups;
each read or write operation is executed on all servers in some group. Moreover,
these groups are defined so that pairs of groups intersect in one or more servers—
the effect of a write operation is thus seen by any subsequent read. Various quorum
schemes differ in the size of the intersection of two quorums. For example, if
faulty processors simply halt then as many as f faulty processors can be tolerated
by having 2f + 1 processors in each group and f + 1 in the intersection. If faulty
processors can exhibit arbitrary behavior then a Byzantine quorum system [22],
involving larger groups and a larger intersection, is required.
A consensus protocol is not needed for performing operations in a quorum
system. So the impossibility result of Fischer et al. [11] does not apply, and pro-
tocols for read and write operations with quorums can be implemented in asyn-
chronous systems. Unfortunately, some services have semantics that cannot be
implemented using quorums of storage servers. Problematic are services support-
ing operations that atomically update the service’s state, such as operations that
involve reading the state, doing some computation, and then writing. The read
and write are separate quorum operations, so a protocol is now needed to prevent
concurrent requests from being interleaved differently (thereby causing states to
diverge) at distinct servers of the quorum. That protocol to control request order-
ings at the distinct storage servers turns out to implement a form of consensus and
thus cannot be built in asynchronous systems.
The practicality of structuring services in terms of quorums of replicated stor-
age servers is not well understood. Various robust storage systems [21, 23, 31]
have been structured in this way, but the feasibility of building a storage ser-
vice from storage servers should not be surprising. Recently, a fault- and attack-
tolerant certification authority, COCA [35], which does involve service operations
having a read followed by a write, was implemented with quorums, suggesting
quorums might have broader practical application than had been thought. Under-
standing the practical applicability of quorum structures for implementing richer
service semantics in asynchronous systems has thus become an active area of re-
search.
Option II: Employ Randomization. The impossibility result of Fischer et al. [11]
does not rule out protocols that use randomization, and practical randomized asyn-
chronous Byzantine agreement protocol have been developed. One example is the
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consensus protocol of Cachin et al. [6], which builds on some new cryptographic
primitives including a non-interactive threshold signature scheme and a threshold
coin-tossing scheme; the protocol is part of the Sintra toolkit [7] developed at the
IBM Zurich Research Center. Sintra supports a variety of broadcast primitives
needed for coordination in replicated systems.
Option III: Sacrifice Liveness (Temporarily). A service cannot be very re-
sponsive when processes and message delivery have become glacially slow, so the
liveness property of a consensus protocol might temporarily be relaxed in those
circumstances. After all, there are no real-time guarantees in an asynchronous
system anyway. The crux of this option, then, is to employ a consensus protocol
(i) that satisfies its liveness property only while the system satisfies assumptions
somewhat stronger than found in an asynchronous system but (ii) that always sat-
isfies its safety property (so different state machine replicas still agree on requests
they process).
Lamport’s Paxos protocol [20] is a well known example of trading liveness for
operation under the weaker assumptions of an asynchronous system. The same
approach is taken in BFT, a Byzantine fault-tolerant protocol for implementing
replicated state machines in an asynchronous system [9]. BFT can be seen as
extending Paxos to tolerate Byzantine failures and has been used to implement
BFS, a Byzantine fault-tolerant NFS service [9]. Considerable effort was devoted
to engineering the BFT protocols so that they are cheap in the absence of failures
or attacks, which was thought to be the common case.
6 Caveat about Server Confidential Data
Some services involve data that must be kept confidential. Unlike secrets used
in connection with cryptography (viz. keys), such server data cannot be changed
periodically as part of proactive recovery, because values now have significance
beyond just being secret and could be part of computations that support the ser-
vices semantics.
Information stored unencrypted on a server become known to the adversary
if that server is compromised. Thus, confidential service data must always be
stored in some sort of encrypted form—either replicated or partitioned among
the servers. Unfortunately, few algorithms have been found that perform inter-
esting computations on encrypted data (although some limited search operations
can now be supported [29]). Even temporarily decrypting the data on a server
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replica or storing it on a backup in unencrypted form risks disclosing secrets to
the adversary.
One promising approach is to employ secure multi-party computations [14].
Much is known about what can and cannot be done as a secure multi-party com-
putation; less is known about what can and cannot be done efficiently, and the
prognosis is not good for efficiently supporting arbitrary computations (beyond
cryptographic operations like decryption and signing).
Note, it is not difficult to implement a service that simply stores confidential
data for subsequent retrieval by clients. The key elements of that solution have
already been described. Confidential data (or a secret key to encrypt the data)
is encrypted using a service public key. The corresponding private key is shared
among replicas using an (n, t+1) secret sharing scheme and refreshed periodically
using proactive secret sharing. A copy of the encrypted data is stored on every
replica to preserve its integrity and availability in face of server compromises and
failures.
Two schemes have been proposed for a client to retrieve the encrypted data.
Each ensures that the only data ever present at a server replica appears in encrypted
form.
Re-encryption. A re-encryption protocol produces a ciphertext encrypted under
one key from a ciphertext encrypted under another but without the plain-
text becoming available during intermediate steps. Such protocols exist for
public key cryptosystems where the private key is shared among a set of
servers [17, 33]. So, to retrieve a piece of encrypted data, the service ex-
ecutes a re-encryption protocol on data encrypted under the service public
key to obtain data encrypted under the client public key.
Blinding. A client chooses a random blinding factor, encrypts it using the service
public key, and sends that to the service. The service multiplies the en-
crypted data by this blinding factor and then employs threshold decryption
to compute un-encrypted but blinded data, which is sent back to the client.
The client, knowing the blinding factor, can then recover the data from that
blinded data. The e-vault [13] project employs this approach.
7 Status and Future Directions
Various systems have been built using the elements we have just outlined. These
efforts are summarized in Figure 1 and Figure 2. There is clearly much to be
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BFS [9]: An NFS file system implementation built using BFT. See Figure 2 for a de-
scription of the BFT toolkit.
COCA [35]: A trustworthy distributed certification authority. COCA avoids consensus
protocols by using a Byzantine quorum systems. The system employs threshold
cryptography to produce certificates signed by the service, using proactive recov-
ery in conjunction with off-line administrator keys for maintaining authenticated
communication links. COCA assumes the asynchronous system model.
E-Vault [13]: A secure distributed storage system. E-vault employs threshold cryp-
tography to maintain private keys, uses blinding for retrieving confidential data,
and implements proactive secret sharing. E-vault assumes the synchronous system
model.
Figure 1: Systems that Employ Elements of Distributed Trust.
learned about how to engineer systems based on these elements, and only a small
part of the landscape has been explored.
Fault-tolerance and attack tolerance are ultimately tied to a set of assumptions
about the environment in which a system must function. Weaker assumptions
should be preferred, since then there is less risk that they will be violated by
natural events or an adversary’s attacks. But that renders irrelevant much prior
work in fault-tolerance and distributed algorithms.
First, prior work has assumed the synchronous model of computation. There
are now good reason to investigate algorithms and system architectures for asyn-
chronous models of computation: concern about denial-of-service attacks and in-
terest in distributed computations that span wide-area networks. Second, prior
work on replication has (mostly) ignored confidentiality. Yet confidentiality is not
orthogonal and poses a new set of challenges, so it cannot be ignored. More-
over, because confidentiality is not a property of an individual component’s states
or state transitions, the usual approaches to specification and system refinement,
which are concerned with what actions components perform, are irrelevant.
The system design approach outlined in this paper has been referred to as im-
plementing distributed trust [4], because it allows a higher level of trust to be
placed in an ensemble than could be placed in a component. There is no magic
here. Distributed trust requires that component compromise be independent. To
date, only a few sources of diversity have been investigated and only a subset
of those have enjoyed practical deployment. Real diversity is messy and often
brought about by random and unpredictable natural processes, in contrast to how
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BFT [9]: A toolkit for implementing replicated state machines in an asynchronous sys-
tem. Services tolerate Byzantine failures and use a proactive recovery mechanism
for periodically re-establishing secure links among replicas and restoring the code
and the state of each replica. BFT employs consensus protocols and sacrifices
liveness to circumvent the impossibility result for consensus in an asynchronous
system. For proactive recovery, BFT assumes a secure cryptographic co-processor
and a watchdog timer. BFT does not provide support for storing confidential infor-
mation or for maintaining a service private key that is required for scalability.
ITTC (Intrusion Tolerance via Threshold Cryptography) [30]: A toolkit that includes a
threshold RSA implementation with distributed key generation and share refresh-
ing. Share refreshing is done when instructed by an administrator. No clear system
model is provided, but the protocols seem to be suitable for use in an asynchronous
system.
Phalanx [23]: Middleware for implementing scalable persistent survivable distributed
object repositories. A Byzantine quorum system allows Byzantine failures to be
tolerated, even in asynchronous systems. Ramdomized protocols are used to cir-
cumvent the impossibility result for consensus in asynchronous systems. Phalanx
does not provide support for storing confidential information or for maintaining
confidential service keys; it also does not implement proactive recovery.
Proactive security toolkit (IBM) [1]: A toolkit for maintaining proactively secure com-
munication links, private keys, and data storage in synchronous systems. The de-
sign employs attack-awareness approach (with ROM) for refreshing the servers’
public/private key pairs.
SINTRA (Secure INtrusion-Tolerant Replication Architecture) [7]: A toolkit that pro-
vides a set of group communication primitives for implementing a replicated state
machine in asynchronous systems where servers can exhibit Byzantine failures.
Randomized protocols are used to circumvent the impossibility result for consen-
sus in an asynchronous system. SINTRA does not provide support for storing
confidential information or for maintaining a service private key that is required
for scalability, although the design of an asynchronous proactive secret sharing
protocol is documented elsewhere.
Figure 2: Toolkits for Implementing Distributed Trust.
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most computations are envisaged (as a preconceived sequence of state transitions).
Think about how epidemics spread (from random, hence diverse, contacts be-
tween individuals) to wipe out a population (a form of “reliable broadcast”); think
about how individuality permits a species to survive or how diverse collections of
species allow an ecosystem to persist.
Finally, if cryptographic building blocks, like secret sharing and threshold
cryptography, seem a bit arcane today, it is perhaps worth recalling that twenty
years ago, research in consensus protocols was a niche concern that systems
builders ignored as impractical. Today, systems designers understand and reg-
ularly use such protocols in order to implement systems that can tolerate various
kinds of failures even though hardware is more reliable than ever. The promising
technologies for attack tolerance, such as secret sharing and threshold cryptogra-
phy, are today a niche concern. This cannot persist for long, given our growing
dependence on networked computers which, unfortunately, makes us hostage not
only to failures but also to attacks.
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